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 The first thing I do when talking to students, especially philosophy majors, is 
remind them that most of the world does not argue the way they do. With some 
exceptions, the general population does not enjoy having every statement and assumption 
laid out and queried, and they do not find that disagreement is something to welcome. 
Philosophers, especially young ones, immensely enjoy the repartee, back and forth, clash 
and counter clash of argument with an eye toward seeing which view in a Popperian 
world remains standing at the end. For them, to state something, to make an assertion and 
not have it questioned, is to be ignored, condescended to, or otherwise not taken 
seriously. When the professor, rather than examining or challenging a view simply says, 
Uh, huh, and moves on to the next raised hand, the student is crestfallen. But this is not 
the case outside of our philosophical aerie.  
 In the real world, people prefer agreement to disagreement, confirmation as 
opposed to questioning. The exception to this is in an inquiry, that argumentative context 
in which the people involved are determined to locate the truth, or, at least, carefully 
examine an approach or alternative. And it is here, in the context of an inquiry, or, as we 
might more coalescently put it, in the context of that aspect of a disagreement that is 
inquiry based, that critical thinking comes to the fore. Critical thinking is dedicated to 
locating the true, or (to be metaphysically looser) the acceptable. This, very goal of 
critical thinking, i.e., the careful examination and evaluation of arguments according to 
accepted rules of practice, is what its critics point to. The idea that the truth is something 
more or less objective, and, more, that the rules of evaluation for an argument are 
identifiable and can be exported to a wide variety of venues, is just what causes 
consternation. 
 Pam Courtenay Hall is quite aware of the difficulties and issues critical thinking 
raises among feminist and postcolonial theorists in its quest for the truth and its 
determination of the standards and techniques that ought be used in locating it. She does a 
fine job of isolating these difficulties and demonstrating their validity. Her thesis is that 
1] these issues are important and must be considered; 2] there is nothing in the view 
called (TC)2 developed by Bailin, Case, Coombs and Daniels that precludes extending the 
(TC)2 approach to include feminist and postcolonial considerations; and 3] critical 
thinking as a discipline needs to broaden itself to take into account the wider political, 
social, and epistemological issues raised in educationally corrective theories.  
 I find myself in the happy difficulty of largely agreeing with Courtenay Hall’s 
conclusions. For one thing, I am certainly on record (some would say far too much on 
record) as arguing that critical thinking is limited in its ability to treat arguers as 
individuals with needs, goals, and personalities (Gilbert 1995, 1997). In addition, I also 
believe that feminist theorists have compelling reasons for urging changes in the structure 
 1 
M. Gilbert’s commentary on P. Courtenay Hall’s “The Limits of Critical Thinking” 
and practice of critical thinking (Gilbert 1994). As a result, I will make three brief 
comments, and then bow out so as to permit discussion to begin.  
 My first comment, is that I do not believe it is all that easy to extend (TC)2 so as 
to permit the flexibility and relativism required by feminist and postcolonial critics. The 
primary reason for this is the separation of the argument qua artifact, from the arguer qua 
situated person. So long as an argument is a metaphysical thing, something that can be 
removed from its context, examined and inspected, the evaluative rules which are then 
applied will also be independent of the core situated factors that vary from context to 
context. In her insightful commentary into my theory of Coalescent Argumentation, 
Sharon Bailin (2000) writes of the Critical-Logical [C-L] approach as follows. 
  
C-L does indeed rest on the possibility of separating the argument from particular 
arguers in some sense, and this is a point clearly rejected in the coalescent 
approach. C-L assumes that there is an important distinction between arguments 
and the process of argumentation. Individuals deploy or construct arguments in 
particular contexts, but such arguments are in some sense public products or 
artifacts which exist within a dialectical tradition and form part of a public 
conversation. [Emphasis added.] 
  
This indicates that a given argument, especially one in what might be called an 
inquiry, does not change with place and person, but is subject to analysis independent of 
who, what, why, and where. This is, I believe incompatible with the feminist and 
postcolonial concerns. 
 My second point follows upon the first. Critical thinking has an antipathy toward 
the idea of psychologism, by which I mean anything that brings the individual and that 
individual’s goals, feelings, intentions and desires into the analysis of an argument. To be 
critical just means to avoid these aspects and rely upon cooler, more isolable, more 
observable aspects of an argument. Thus, the Pragma-Dialecticians require that 
everything considered in an argument be spoken, presented, or, at the least, 
enthymematically demanded (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984). Inquiries into why 
someone holds a position, how they feel about it, how they came to it are all ruled out of 
court in deciding the value of an argument or the worth of a claim. This I take to be 
directly opposed to a good deal of the criticisms leveled at critical thinking. Jagger, for 
example, writes: “Just as observation directs, shapes and partially defines emotions, so 
too emotion directs, shapes, and even partially defines observation” (Jagger 154). 
Consequently, failure to consider the emotional aspects of an argument entails failure to 
understand the dynamic relation between the judgements and values involved within it.  
 My third point is to suggest that there are views which will aid in structuring the 
concerns with which Courtenay Hall is working. Willard, for example, talks in A Theory 
of Argumentation of the need to understand rationality as malleable characteristic that has 
an anthropological aspect as well as a critical one. Courtenay Hall quotes a story about a 
native Indian student whose approach to his elders is not to be critical, but to listen to 
stories and take in what is offered. Similarly, when I teach writing I always explain to 
students that criticisms are to be heard, absorbed, and used for what they have to offer, 
and that one must separate the problem a critique identifies from the solution the critic 
offers. Never, I urge, argue with a critic. This is a difficult skill, but vitally important to 
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the creative process. Willard and I have been campaigning for some time to extend the 
limits of what is considered to be argument, of what is allowable and refused within the 
halls of critical thinking. Others, like Tindale similarly attempt to expand the borders to 
include the rhetorical notions that permeate our communications. Indeed, there is much to 
be garnered from the rhetorical tradition and, in particular, Perelman & Obrechts-
Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric and its use of audience ought be taken into account. 
 Finally, I must say again that critical thinking is a valuable and vital exercise. I 
teach it, and when I do, I do so more or less classically, while at the same time 
introducing comments and disagreements with the traditional approach. So, yes, critical 
thinking is a valuable skill, and it needs to be taught. And, yes, being critical about 
critical thinking is very important. I urge us, with Courtenay Hall, to find more ways to 
expand and liberate critical thinking from being the iconic tool of a dominant hegemony, 
to serving as one of a broader set of instruments that aims first to understand, second to 
forge agreement, and only thirdly to critique according to set standards. 
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